Jihadism in the Sahel

Unpacking centuries‑old currents, fractured states, and the covert arms flows that empower today’s jihadi networks

Historical Roots of Contemporary Jihadism in the Sahel: From Al-Maghili to Modern Militancy

The Sahel region is a biogeographical belt stretching from Cameroon to present‑day Sudan. Scientifically, it denotes an area defined by similar landscapes which are acacia and savannah. Countries most commonly associated with it by identity include Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mauritania and in certain discourse, southern Libya and, more loosely, Cape Verde and Algeria. In geopolitical discourse, focus falls on Niger, Chad, the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea. These connotations are largely negative, shaped by a distinct form of nomadic jihadism, viewed as innate by the region's former colonial powers, primarily France. Sudan also features in this problematic narrative; for the purposes of this article, then, "the Sahel" refers to this contested zone. In this article, we will examine the Sahel, focusing loosely on the Fulani and related groups as represented in French-language discourse, to gain a deeper geopolitical understanding of its roots.

Moreover, this area has experienced not only a spate of jihadist movements so intricately interwoven that untangling their roots feels like needing a painkiller opioid, but also a series of coups that would make other African states under incompetent leadership envious. These coups have not always been popular, culminating in the demise of one of Africa's most beloved liberation stalwarts, Thomas Sankara, and more recently, in Pan‑African discourse, Ibrahim Traoré(Loved by All?). In this article, I will examine the roots, the intricacies, and the web of actors that have produced a surge of jihadist elements so much so that state responses have included democratic coups to arrest this decline and the emergence of a national identity rejected by the nomadic and ignored by those who label them as such.

By adopting a historical lens and scrutinizing regional actors, we can understand why the Sahel has evolved this way and what implications it holds for non‑affected parts of sub‑Saharan Africa. More attention is warranted, as the future bears consequences for us all should we choose to ignore these dynamics. Crucially, the absence of an African‑led solution as echoed in past continental conflicts has driven a turn toward radicalism to purge Africa of its perceived ills, only to return to the same starting point that bred those very elements.

Yours Problematically, The Sahel.

Historical Roots (15th–19th Centuries)

Jihadism in the Sahel can be traced to the 15th century. A variety of factors have led to the present‑day problem, but its roots lie in the harshness of the region and the coincidence of the functional Islamic states that thrived there. Statehood, over time, becomes ethnicity, and as geographical classification is often substituted for origin and ethnicity, it is important to understand why citizens of the Sahel can act in anti–Pan‑African ways today and wage wars against their brethren.

Ibn Askar's Dawhat al‑Nashir li‑Mahasin man kana min al‑Maghrib min Ahl al‑Karn al‑ashir and Ahmad Baba al‑Timbukti's Nayl al‑Ibtihaj bi‑tatriz al‑Dibaz form the basis of our knowledge of al‑Maghili¹. Hence, the roots of contemporary Sahelian jihadism can be traced to the 15th‑century reform movement initiated by scholars like Muhammad al‑Maghili (d. c. 1503–06)¹. Al‑Maghili, an influential Algerian scholar, established a profound intellectual tradition that would resonate through centuries of West African Islamic thought¹. His reformist ideology denounced what he perceived as corrupt and un‑Islamic practices of West African Muslim states—condemning illegal taxation, seizure of private property, and the syncretistic blending of Islamic and traditional African practices¹.

The foundation of his radicalism drew anger from his contemporary Maghreb scholars, yet he found favour at the tables of many West African rulers. If Christianity was the tool Abyssinian kings used to claim to be God's representative under the sun, the Islamic city‑states and empires of the Sahel laid claim to their own legitimacy making scholars like al‑Maghili highly sought after.

Al‑Maghili's influence led to an assumed Arabification of Islam in Africa, and his critique of the brands of Islam practiced by Hausa, Tuareg, and Fulani states meant that those who adopted his version of Sharia often had to reject an identity innate to them their African identity¹. With the exception of a few states on the periphery of this Islamic enlightenment, most that embraced his reforms encouraged the subjugation of women, the rejection of African ideals, and the near‑erasure of anything deemed "African" that did not align with al‑Maghili's vision of Islam. To further reinforce why this was problematic we can see through the Watanga (sometimes spelled Ouattanka, Ouattara, or Wattara) who were Muslim merchant-warriors and settler elites originally from the Mande-speaking regions of West Africa, especially areas like Wassoulou, Kong, and parts of present-day Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Mali². They practiced a localised version of Islam that adapted local customs to Islamic principles and were semi‑mercantile in nature, such that trade and commerce were their chosen lifestyle in contrast to the purist ambitions of Al‑Maghili's adherents. Islam served as a guide for personal ethics, and the Watanga were reputed for their moral integrity, an asset that helped them thrive in business by virtue of this ethics². Several Mansas of the Malian Empire employed the services, wit and teaching prowess of these Watanga, who, though able to turn to warrior tactics at will to achieve their ends, most often aimed to silently nudge the ethics of the society they lived in without forgetting their commercial and mercantile tradition².

It is on this general foundation that the Fulani and the Tuareg peoples of today were to adopt a radical brand of Islam. This is not to cast all members of these groups under the same brush, but to help us understand what bred the foundations of the present‑day threat. The harshness of the region's climate; desert or semi‑desert meant that one could not live here except by faith. A religion demanding total submission to God was needed by a land where daytime temperatures soared above 40 °C and nights plunged below freezing. With warring city‑states across borders and Christian heretics deemed sworn enemies of Islam, nothing could exist in this region without faith. It was the threat of people being forced to wrestle between religion and their continental identity as Africans.

In the fourteenth century, these folk could not have viewed themselves through present‑day scholarly lenses as we do now; hence there wasn't an African identity, for lack of knowledge of down‑south ancestors and because loyalty focused on kin and state, as defined and in all its disambiguations of language. Ancient traditions and wrestling identities were thus at play when this form of radical Islam swept the region. We can see in the ensuing caste system of Mauritania how clearly this played out: the Africanised Arabs called the Haratine in contrast to white Berbers formed a caste ancestrally enslaved for that lineage³. Moorish elements further subjugated those of African and black skin. Notably, there were Black Moors, but most available discourse, viewed purely through an African lens, reinforces this.

Hence, if present‑day implications show that caste and slavery persist in Mauritania among Black Berbers, Moors or even Bedouin tribes, we then see how pre‑colonial Islamic city‑states scholarly influenced from the Maghreb viewed what we have come to call Africanism³. Scholarly discourse on the Fulani speaks of interactions among non‑Fulani, lower‑caste Fulani and Fulani elites; the Fulani are a good litmus test of what these preceding views produced in the present. We can then examine why post‑colonial statehood has been largely disregarded by these peoples and why they maintain stronger tribal loyalty.

Fula Nomad.

Fulanis and Jihadism: Root Causes, Misunderstandings and Associated Tribes

The 17th through 19th centuries witnessed the emergence of powerful jihadi movements that fundamentally reshaped the political landscape of West Africa. The Fulani jihads, led by Muslim scholars and teachers, represented a systematic attempt to establish Islamic states governed by Sharia law. These movements were supported by diverse ethnic groups including the Fulbe, Hausa, Mande, Wolof, and Tuareg peoples, demonstrating the trans-ethnic appeal of reformist Islamic ideology. The most significant of these movements was the Sokoto Caliphate, established by Usman dan Fodio in 1804⁴. Dan Fodio, a Fulani Islamic scholar, initiated his jihad after being exiled from the Hausa city-state of Gobir. His movement rapidly expanded across northern Nigeria, conquering major Hausa kingdoms and establishing an Islamic empire that would become one of the largest states in Africa during the 19th century. The Sokoto Caliphate extended over 1,000 miles from present-day Burkina Faso to northern Cameroon and included most of northern Nigeria⁴. Similar movements emerged across the Sahel, including the Macina Empire (1818-1862) in Mali⁵ and the Toucouleur Empire (1848-1893)⁶. These 19th-century jihads created a tradition of religious revolution that would influence subsequent generations of reformist movements. However, it is crucial to note that these historical jihads differed significantly from contemporary jihadist insurgencies in their epistemological foundations, social bases, and political objectives and religious revolution that would influence subsequent generations of reformist movements¹⁷.

Present Day Fulani experience Vs Local Peoples

Against the backdrop of this history, there are many challenges in the present day. The isolation effect is very prevalent in influencing jihad. Ideological sieves cannot always be captured by state intelligence apparatuses, as it borders on religious discrimination, which means that, with the vast majority of Sahelian states being Muslim, certain activities are given a more relaxed tone. If a sheikh is radicalizing young men and women, it becomes hard to put an early stop to this propaganda especially because those in charge of Islamic affairs might bear more sympathy, particularly if the foundation of the message is an anti‑Western critique. It is not until bombs and insurgency ignite that the scope of the problem becomes understood, long after an implosion of violence.

Why is there a lack of understanding at its foundation? Because of the isolation effect. When groups live in harsh or mountainous terrain as seen in the American Appalachian region they tend to develop a radically distinct ideology. Often this defeats state goals of nation‑building, but the state only takes keen interest in such regions when mineral resources are discovered. The discovery of these resources leads to the exclusion of the peoples who have lived there, who often were already ignored by the governments in place.

Northern Nigeria exemplifies this, with an almost dismissive discourse that labels Fulanis as violent and primitive, while these underlying causes are ignored. There is a nomadic sense in these people's way of life: the state has often restricted service delivery to these areas, and more often the state only swoops in to extract mineral resources for the aid of diplomats and bureaucrats far from the region. The ensuing reaction is an almost genocidal approach to security, which further exacerbates the problem rather than alleviating it.

Recently, the Burkinabé army, in frustration, marched a group of Fulani boys who had allegedly been harboring insurgents into a forest and killed them indiscriminately⁷. While this military approach is meant to project fear among potential civilian supporters to discourage insurgency, it instead provides fuel to jihadist recruiters. After all, is it not an honor in these men's and women's eyes to die in service of their god and purpose? Indiscriminate violence only fans the flames, as belief in martyrdom drives up recruitment.

Even the soldiers who fight these insurgencies are Muslim, but to the jihadists they're seen as either imperialist extensions or hypocrites who bask in luxury while only ceremonially practicing Islam. Politicians fan public hatred toward nomadic groups like the Tuareg, Azawad, and Wolof factions ; using these divisions as a getaway from responsibility for dealing with insurgencies, all while mobilizing the populace against what they call a Western‑backed revolt.

The irony of the propaganda levied by both sides is that they accuse each other of being foreign‑backed in pursuit of their statehood aims, yet evidence has shown that governments receive aid from Western or Eastern geopolitical partners, and insurgent groups like the FLA receive advanced drone training and weapons from Western groups, including Ukraine, with American and French agencies hidden behind these channels⁸. The absence of an African‑led solution is stark, and this continuous vacuum is driven by the dismissive tendency to identify Sub‑Saharan countries by religion except for partners like Uganda, which have intervened with limited, tangible success in certain belts of the Sahel.

The French Colonial System and Linguistic Isolation

The Francophone Paradox

The prevalence of jihadist movements in francophone Sahel countries, compared to other regions, reflects deep structural issues rooted in French colonial policies. The French "assimilation" system created unique conditions that later contributed to the isolation and marginalization of certain communities⁹. Colonial authorities sought to extend French culture and language to their territories, aiming to produce subjects who adopted French customs and values. French was imposed as the language of administration, education, and trade, while indigenous languages were systematically suppressed exacerbating the region's existing problems⁹. It is no coincidence that former French colonies have such a problematic history with jihadism.

We cannot ignore that there was an Islamic fervor preceding French colonialism, but the nature of state‑building in these regions had to wrestle with assimilation policies. The desert landscape fosters devotion‑based movements after all, as I've said above, nothing can live there without faith. This is the same lore that inspired Frank Herbert's Dune when describing Arrakis and explains why such religious fervor can thrive here, unlike in other parts of Africa. Similarly, Ethiopian Orthodox Christians in the mold of the Ewostathian movement developed their own brand of religious zeal, anchored in the inseparable bond between Christianity and Ethiopian identity.

Moreover, contemporary French intervention often follows the pattern of "aid" tied to areas where French companies have commercial interests undermining any genuine attempt to solve the region's deeper problems⁹.

Jihadist groups have also exploited informational isolation. Most international media coverage, academic research, and policy discussions about the Sahel are conducted in French, limiting access for non–French speakers and reducing global awareness of the region's complexities. This situation allows extremist networks to operate with less scrutiny from observers who lack French proficiency and perpetuates the marginalization of local populations unable to engage in policy debates conducted in the colonial tongue. This further causes a problem for African solutions to be implemented. The same informational barriers are prevalent in the DRC Wars and Cabo Delgado Insurgency in Mozambique unless one is tapped into security studies.

The linguistic legacy of French rule also reinforces social hierarchies: French‑educated elites occupy privileged positions in government, business, and civil society, while the majority remains excluded from formal political and economic life⁹. These exclusions generate grievances that jihadist movements exploit, presenting themselves as alternatives to corrupt, French‑speaking elites.

French Soldiers during Operation Barkhane.

Contemporary Jihadist Groups: JNIM and Islamic State Affiliates

Jama'at Nusrat al‑Islam wal‑Muslimin (JNIM)

JNIM, formed in March 2017, represents the most significant jihadist coalition in the Sahel region¹⁰. The group emerged from the merger of four previously separate organizations: Ansar Dine, Katibat Macina, al‑Mourabitoun, and the Sahara branch of al‑Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former Malian diplomat and Tuareg leader, JNIM has become one of Africa's deadliest jihadist groups¹⁰. JNIM's organizational structure reflects both local grievances and global jihadist ideology: it operates as a decentralized coalition, with component groups maintaining relative autonomy while acknowledging Ag Ghali's overall leadership¹⁰. This structure allows JNIM to adapt to local conditions while maintaining ideological coherence and strategic coordination. Since its formation, the group has been responsible for more than sixty percent of violent episodes linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel, expanding from northern Mali across Burkina Faso, Niger, and increasingly into coastal West African countries¹⁰.

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), later renamed Islamic State Sahel Province, is the primary ISIS affiliate in the region. Formed in 2015 under the leadership of Adnan Abu Walid al‑Sahrawi, ISGS emerged from a split within the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)¹¹. ISGS has distinguished itself through its particularly brutal tactics and focus on civilian targets, directing roughly forty‑five percent of its attacks against non‑combatants. In Niger, about two‑thirds of ISGS attacks target civilians, suggesting limited popular support and a reliance on coercion rather than voluntary adherence¹¹.

Although JNIM and ISGS often compete for territory and resources, they have also collaborated on specific operations—an unusual pragmatism dubbed the "Sahelian exception" to the broader JNIM–ISIS rivalry. This pragmatic cooperation reflects the localized nature of the conflict and their shared interest in undermining state authority.

JNIM Islamists.

The Fulani Factor: Ethnicity, Nomadism, and Jihadist Recruitment

The Fulani are one of West Africa's largest ethnic groups, numbering around thirty million across twenty‑one countries from Mauritania to Sudan. Approximately one‑third still follow traditional cattle‑rearing practices, migrating seasonally in search of pasture and water. This mobility brings them into frequent conflict with sedentary agricultural communities, especially as climate change and environmental degradation shrink grazing lands. Population growth, urbanization, and changes in land‑use patterns have further restricted traditional migration routes¹².

Economic marginalization has created additional grievances that jihadist groups exploit the primacy being JNIM though Boko Haram and the Islamic State have done so¹². Many Fulani feel excluded from formal economic opportunities and government services, leading to resentment toward state authorities. Key jihadist organizations—including the Macina Liberation Front led by Amadou Koufa, Ansaroul Islam founded by Ibrahim Malam Dicko, and factions within JNIM—count significant Fulani membership¹². Research identifies multiple factors driving Fulani recruitment:

Protection and Security: Fulani communities seek defense against attacks by ethnic militias and security forces.
Economic Opportunity: Jihadist groups offer salaries, access to markets, and control over trade routes, appealing to marginalized youth.
Religious Identity: The emphasis on religious purity and proper Islamic governance resonates with some Fulani.
Revenge and Retaliation: Cycles of violence against Fulani communities push some to join jihadists for vengeance.

This dynamic has produced a destructive stigmatization cycle: neighboring populations increasingly view all Fulani as potential terrorists, leading to attacks and exclusion that drive more Fulani toward jihadist groups for protection and identity. In Mali and Burkina Faso, militias like the Dozo and Koglweogo have carried out deadly counter‑terror operations against Fulani civilians, displacing thousands and fueling further radicalization¹².

Weak National Identities and Artificial Borders

The colonial powers drew the borders of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso with little regard for ethnic, linguistic, or cultural boundaries, creating states that lack organic unity or shared identity. Surveys show that barely half of respondents in many Sahelian countries prioritize national identity over their ethno‑linguistic group. In times of crisis, loyalty to ethnic or religious identity often outweighs allegiance to the nation, creating openings that jihadist groups exploit by offering trans‑ethnic religious solidarity.

As a result, JNIM has built an almost seamless information network, using these trans‑ethnic ties to slip between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso like water through a sieve. Ironically, the insurgents now exhibit more coordinated intelligence gathering than the state apparatuses they evade. Fighters move freely across borders, perpetuating violence and achieving their objectives by exploiting historic tribal loyalties while post‑colonial governments fail to account for the broad‑based nature of their citizenry.

Meanwhile, today's military juntas leverage international discourse as propaganda to justify their own legitimacy struggles the primacy being survival itself, since coups often follow coups and to secure resources. They also face isolation from former partners who may quietly support Islamist insurgencies to recoup lost economic dividends. Take, for example, Ibrahim Traoré: beloved at home and abroad, yet confronted by an escalating JNIM threat.

Even well‑intentioned juntas are stretched thin by the lack of African partners who truly understand the region. The mounting casualties among Malian and Burkinabé forces attest that this is no ordinary enemy. Insurgents now wield drone capabilities and technological prowess(evidently supported by Ukraine) that have even challenged the Russian Africa Corps (formerly Wagner)¹³. And, as we've seen in Syria, juntas that rely solely on Russian support face a harsh reality: if they fail to deliver results, Moscow—already consumed by its own war—may simply walk away¹³.

Ugandan Troops training for their AMISOM assignment.

Accosted Solutions: An African problem needs an African Solutions

Same Mistakes, New Faces

Gerard Prunier shows why Ethiopia has largely escaped the trappings of being a developing economy and the dangerous mix of Islamism and poverty that provides the backdrop for extremism, because governance in Ethiopia takes into account the Ethiopian distinctiveness of its tribal populace¹⁴. This means there is loyalty to tribal kin above religious fervor, which has made it effective in dealing with these challenges. Ethiopia's state intelligence has shown savviness in this particular issue, employing people from each tribal kin to understand what leads to any extremist spillover into the Islamist problem that births jihad. We can see this through the way Meles Zenawi dealt with the Afar region meaning any spillover or explosion of violence was viewed not as an Islamist problem but as an Afar problem¹⁴.

The problem with discourse in Pan‑African studies relating to, for example, Fulanis is that it purely ostracizes. ¹⁶This comes from a point of pain, as most who ostracize have lost relatives, friends, or lands for not sympathizing with Islamist radicalism. We cannot expect public discourse to understand the underlying issues, but states have a responsibility to do so. Ignoring this as in the case of Ghana; has led to an ensuing threat on its northern border, which has seen President Mahama looking to buy drones from Ukraine and improve military cooperation, but again this creates the same problematic issue: addressing problems through militarization.

Juntas are better equipped to deal with this issue, as they have more time, whereas in Ghana's democratic system presidents must balance reelection aims with delivering immediate results for electoral gains. The problem with juntas is often the lack of intelligentsia in their ranks, members having ascended by military merit, so their default approach to challenges is hard‑handedness. It would be a miracle if Mali and Burkina Faso's juntas or "people's will" leaders—survive the Islamists, not just on their borders but also in Mali, where they control close to 30–40 percent of the land. The first step is astute intelligence cooperation in the Sahel, not grounded in mistrust and not crafted by eastern partners like Russia, because they too have ends to appease to their own people. These un‑African solutions inevitably show themselves when the going gets tough.

The more people die in these areas, the more the situation resembles the American‑Taliban scenario, where the US noticed that the Taliban had more popularity among its people than their supposed Western‑backed democratic government. Solutions involving mineral concessions in exchange for military support as in the Russian company Nordgold's deal with the Burkinabé government give jihadist ideologues more fuel to recruit young men. Fearing they will be civilian targets, locals submit to terrorist networks simply for peace. The longer a jihad goes on, the more the path to peace means ceding autonomy to radical extremists.

As Zolfikar finds in Syria, being a reformed jihadist in pursuit of peace is not easy: neighbors look upon you with suspicion, and the people you govern never forget your jihadist past. As Syria's Christians, Druze, and Alawis are discovering, former jihadists do not reform; rather, they embed their ideology into the education system. Hence, it is paramount that African states move to provide African solutions.

African Solutions: Museveni and His Army, Nyerere and the Elder Statesmen

The Ugandan army is eagerly engaged abroad and brings an astute understanding of regional wars even in areas where Uganda is not geographically located. Yoweri Museveni, in pursuit of a Pan‑African solution to African problems, has succeeded in the DRC, Somalia, and interventions in neighbouring Burundi¹⁵. The Ugandan army has achieved tangible success internally against rebel movements, many of which are based across its borders; demonstrating a form of Pan‑African merit¹⁵. Their general approach to conflict resolution takes local realities into account. There is an absence of individual grandeur and a more balanced effort to wedge different actors and interests.

A recent communique on the Israel‑Iran war from Museveni hints at the ideology underpinning this focus on resolution. His careful weighing of Iran's grievances and the Middle East's dynamics particularly Jewish suspicion of its neighbours characterized the message. The same approach has guided Uganda's army in eastern Congo¹⁵.

The Kenyan army has also proved adept, not only in militarization abroad when called upon but in striving to understand local realities on both sides. Nyerere's diplomatic role in Pan‑African mediation is sorely missed; when present—as exemplified by Thabo Mbeki's astute handling of the war in eastern Congo—such elder statesmen have steered solutions that few herald today.

That a group of southern and eastern African leaders once sat together to craft solutions for eastern Congo. And yet now must defer to Qatari mediation highlights a major problem. When both sides in a conflict must meet the interests of an external peace broker, such as the United States via Qatar, the lived identities and interests of Sahelian agitators are sidelined.

Africa's future leaders must engage in historical studies of pre‑colonial African history, the colonial merging of cultures, and the post‑colonial intricacies that emerged. Only by addressing the social and economic issues that, when exacerbated by religious fervor, lead to calls for military intervention, can we move toward genuine peace.

References;

1. Muhammad al-Maghili – Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_al-Maghili

2. History of the Kong Empire also known as the Wattara Empire or Ouattara Empire. YouTube: BioGreat Tv, July 31, 2020.

3. Justice still in chains for Mauritania's slaves. Justice Info, August 23, 2021. https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/81062-justice-still-in-chains-mauritania-slaves.html

4. Sokoto Caliphate – Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sokoto_Caliphate

5. A history of the Massina empire (1818–1862). African History Extra, July 9, 2023.

6. Al‑Hadj Umar Tall (1797–1864) Islamic Scholar And Empire Builder. The Standard, May 31, 2019. https://standard.gm/el-hadj-umar-tall-1797-1864-islamic-scholar-and-empire-builder/

7. Fulani Crisis Shows How Terror Groups Capitalize on Ethnic Tension. Africa Defense Forum, September 19, 2023. https://adf-magazine.com/2023/09/fulani-crisis-shows-how-terror-groups-capitalize-on-ethnic-tension/

8. Ukrainian drones provide support for northern Mali's rebels. Le Monde, October 13, 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/10/13/ukrainian-drones-provide-support-for-northern-mali-s-rebels_6729231_124.html

9. French Efforts toward Assimilation. Lumen Learning. https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-worldhistory/chapter/28-3-3-french-efforts-toward-assimilation/

10. JNIM flag – National Counterterrorism Center | Terrorist Groups. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/terrorist_groups/jnim.html

11. Examining Extremism: Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. CSIS, July 22, 2021. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-islamic-state-greater-sahara

12. Understanding Fulani Perspectives on the Sahel Crisis. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, April 1, 2022. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-fulani-perspectives-sahel-crisis/

13. Russia's Wagner mercenaries leaving Mali, Africa Corps to remain. Al Jazeera, June 6, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/6/russias-wagner-mercenaries-leaving-mali-africa-corps-to-remain

14. Interview with Gérard Prunier (First part). Ethiopia Observer, April 21, 2018. https://www.ethiopiaobserver.com/2018/04/21/interview-with-gerard-prunier-first-part/

15. President Museveni says ready to mediate for peace in DR Congo. The Independent, January 29, 2025. https://www.independent.co.ug/museveni-says-ready-to-step-in-to-end-dr-congo-chaos/

16. Ejiofor, P. F. (2021). ‘Fulanis are foreign terrorists’: The social construction of a suspect community in the Sahel. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 15(2), 333–355. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.2015841

17. Smaldone, J. P. (1977). Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate: Historical and Sociological Perspectives (pp. 221–224). Cambridge University Press.